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3deficit? Is this acceptable?) and how the tax cut affect the economic growth, rather than which
distribution of income.
2 – A Progressive Income Tax Schedule: Theoretical Results
The large majority of European and OECD countries have a progressive income tax. Given
the respect, or not, of horizontal equity (HE) prior principle (a normative goal)  “progression
arises from principles of vertical equity” (Lambert, 2001, p. 175): vertical equity states
taxpayers in unequal circumstances bear appropriately unequal taxes (a matter of judgment,
that is an ethical norm referring to the treatments of unequals)2.
The literature suggests some rationales, for instance the Equal sacrifice principle (by using an
increasing concave utility of income function equal for all individuals, this calls for a equal
utility loss for all)3 as well as the Benefit principle (by relating the tax liability to the
expenditure side of budget)4; the automatic stabilizing effect on the macro-economy; the envy
reducer capacity.
After the seminal Atkinson (1970) and Shorrocks’ (1983) papers another way to justify
progression was on hand to the researchers: I shall give an idea about it referring to the papers
where it is opportune. Before to do that I provide some definitions about what it defines as a
progressive income tax as well as some other useful instruments.
2.1   Some Definitions
An income tax schedule embodies a succession of upward and fixed marginal tax rates (the
rate structure) on bands of taxable income with different specified threshold values.
If t(x) is the tax liability5 of the pre tax money income x and is a differentiable function, an
increasing with income average tax rate t(x)/x is the condition for strict progression
d [t(x)/x] / dx > 0     ∀x      iff       t’(x) > t(x)/x     ∀x > 0
In this case the tax burden is function only of money incomes while the typical real income
tax code usually is also function of other features: we shall see how to take account of these
non-income characteristics.
                                                
2 - In a second best-world there is a potential trade-off between HE and VE objectives (see Musgrave 1990).
3 - See Samuelson (1947).
4 - See Head (1964), Snow and Warren (1983).
5 - I assume 0 ≤ t’(x) <1 (incentive preservation principle), then 0 ≤ t (x) < x (where t’(x) is the first derivative).
4Let F(x) be the pre tax distribution of income and f(x) the associated density function, then
(assuming no convergence problem at the top end of the distribution)
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Total tax ratio = T/X = g =  N  ∫ t(x) f(x) dx / Nµ = ∫ t(x) f(x) dx / µ
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where µ = ∫ x f(x) dx                    and z could be described as ‘any income level in excess of the
         0                            highest one actually occurred’ (Lambert, 2001, p. 20)
According to these integrals it can derive definitions for the Lorenz curve for pre tax income
LX  and the Concentration curves for post–tax income and tax liabilities, LX – T  and LT 6.
                                                                                   y
p = F(y)    Æ       LX (p)  = [1 / µ]    ∫ x f(x) dx
                                                                                0         
          y
p = F(y)    Æ   LX – T  (p)   = [1 / µ(1 – g)]  ∫ [x – t(x)] f(x) dx
                                                                                      y       
0
p = F(y)    Æ    LT  (p)     = [1 / µg]  ∫ t(x) f(x) dx
                                                                                        0
By using these definitions it derives the relationship between LX, LX – T and LT
LX ≡ g LX – T   + (1-g) LT
The LX curve is a weighted average of tax and post tax income Concentration curves: as a
result it can be shown that if and only if the tax burdens are distributed more unequally than
before-tax incomes, the post tax incomes shares are more equal than the latter. Where LX and
LT curves are superimposed also LX – T has to be it.   
Furthermore Jakobsson (1976) and Fellman (1976) point out that this relationship is strictly
linked with the progression of the tax schedule:
d [t(x)/x] / dx ≥ 0      ∀x    iff     LX – T  ≥  LX  ≥ LT         ∀ F(x)
Thus, with a tax code designed for any sub-population where the only differences among
people are the incomes, a strictly progressive income tax is within group inequality reducing
according to the dominance of post tax income concentration curve over the pre tax income
Lorenz curve. According to t(x) function only of money incomes I approach the normative
issue.
                                                
6 - A Lorenz Curve measures income shares plotting them against cumulative proportion of income units in the
pre tax distribution. The units are arranged in ascending order of their income. The assumptions on the form of
t(x) function (5th footnote) allow to consider the LX – T  concentration curve as a Lorenz curve (no reranking effect).
52.2 Progression, Progressivity and Welfare
According to Atkinson (1970) a dominance result by comparisons of Lorenz curves may fail:
not any pair of income distributions can be clearly ranked (the Lorenz ordering is a partial
ordering). By the Shorrocks (1983) theorem, sometimes it may go beyond the Lorenz curve
comparison failing: by using generalized Lorenz curve concept it could be possible to rank
unambiguously more (not any) distributions of income.
With these theorems it is possible to describe why progression should be a “good thing”, that
is to verify if the welfare related with a progressive income tax is higher than the welfare
associated with another way to raise the same revenue, in this case an equal yield flat tax
applied to the same distribution of before tax incomes.
According to the fact that generalized Lorenz curves (by the Jakobsson-Fellman theorem) for
post tax incomes, when progressive income tax and equal yield flat tax apply, are respectively7
                                                                                                       y
           p = F(y)    Æ  GL X – T   (p)  =  µ(1 – g) ∫ [x – t(x)] f(x) dx / µ(1 – g)    =  µ(1 – g) L X – T  (p)
                                                                     0     y                                                         
    and  p = F(y)   Æ  GL X (1 – G) (p) =  µ(1 – g) ∫ x f(x) dx / µ                         =  µ(1 – g) L X (p)
                                                                                                                          0
it can be inferred that the distribution of post tax incomes associated with a progressive income
tax rank dominates the distribution of post tax incomes related with the proportional tax. By
Shorrocks theorem the dominance between GL curves implies (and it’s implied by) a higher
level of Social Welfare reached by the dominant position:
W X – T  ≥ W X (1 – G)       for all increasing and strictly concave U(•)8
This shows that choosing progressive income taxation rather than a proportional tax it
obtains the smaller decrease of Social Welfare.
Hence the literature has developed measures of structural (or local) progression and effective
progression, the former linked with the degree of progression along the income scale, the latter
with the taxation effects on the after-tax income distribution.
Both give information about the consequences of different tax income schedules on their
disproportionality degree and resultant redistributive effects9 and what is important for my
                                                
7 - By (x–tx) = post-tax income, when equal-yield flat tax applies: the net incomes means in both cases are equal.
                                         z
8 - Where WF = ∫ U (x) f (x) dx
                               
          
0
9 - See Jakobsson (1976) and Kakwani (1977a). Note that, advocating the fundamental Atkinson theorem (1970),
Formby and Smith (1986, p. 562) comment, “If Lorenz curves intersect, a social welfare function can always be
found which ranks income distribution differently than does the Gini coefficient or other summary measures of
6purposes is the possibility, by using measures of effective progression, to obtain significant
conclusions about the level of Social Welfare that different tax schedules incorporate.
Usually when the analysts wish to evaluate it they first look at two indexes, the Reynolds-
Smolensky (ΠRS) and the Kakwani (ΠK) indexes: they are scalar index numbers, able to resume
a tax code and income distribution pair. They are defined in terms of separation of the relevant
Lorenz curves (the higher the separation between the curves, the higher the index),
                       1                                                                                                              1
ΠK = 2 ∫  [LX  (p) – LT (p)] dp      ;       ΠRS =  2 ∫  [LX – T (p) -  LX  (p)] dp
             0                                                                                                              0
or, in a short way, ΠK = CT – GX  ;    ΠRS = GX – CX – T
where GX is the Gini coefficient for before-tax income, CT and CX – T (here, CX – T = GX – T) the
concentration coefficients respectively for tax liabilities and post tax income. The higher is
ΠRS, the ‘more’ dominant is the distribution of post tax incomes over the distribution defined
by LX, where as before the latter has to be interpreted as the distribution of after-tax incomes
resulting from an equal yield flat tax.
Clearly it has to be a link between the ΠRS and ΠK indexes strictly connected with the identity
that represent the LX curve as a weighted average between LX – T and LT.
By Kakwani (1977b) it can be shown that (if no reranking through the taxation process is
present)
ΠRS = [g / (1 – g)] ΠK
What result from the Social Welfare point of view? Do we can conclude that a ‘more’
progressive tax is a better tax? For instance, given the assumptions made and choosing the
social evaluation function (where µ and G are the mean and the Gini coefficient (Sen 1973)),
V (µ, G) = µ (1-G)
it can be shown that10                 W X – T  -  W X (1 – g)   =  µ (1-g) [(1 - GX – T) – (1 - GX)]
  W X – T  -  W X (1 – g)   =  µ (1-g) ΠRS
  W X – T  -  W X (1 – g)   =  µ g ΠK
In both cases the higher is the relevant index the greater is the Welfare Premium from
progression.
                                                                                                                                           
inequality.”. As a consequence, if Lorenz curves do not intersect, any inequality index that fulfil the Pigou-Dalton
transfer principle and Symmetry will be robust.
10 - By the equality CX – T = GX – T .
72.3    Income Tax Reforms
The results described in the last paragraph allow to analyse any personal tax income reform:
by means of a sample of the distribution of before-tax incomes it can make an estimate to
predict the consequences for distributional effects, the disproportionality of the new tax burden
and, where feasible, the question of normative significance. Assuming a fixed distribution of
pre tax incomes F(x), there are three alternative cases according to a change in a tax schedule
t(x):
a yield neutral/increasing/decreasing tax reform according as g (total tax ratio)
is equal/ increased/decreased after the reform
Also the measures of structural progression11 ΠRS and ΠK modify in accordance with this
change.
 The consequences for g and indexes may be linked and operate together, turning out
different overall results of the reform12. Consistent with these, the literature is able to provide
to practitioners normative assessments about some general cases:
• a progression neutral tax cut/hike for all;
• a not13 progression neutral tax cut/hike for all;
• a single-crossing tax reform and a double-crossing tax reform.
About a progressivity-neutral reform, consider a ‘linear’ income tax cut/hike preserving
some local progressivity measure such as RP and LP14. From the old schedule t1(x) it has to be,
for the RP case
        t2 (x) = t1(x) – a [x- t1(x)]         ;    x- t2(x) = [x- t1(x)] + a [x- t1(x)]
and for the LP case       t2 (x) = t1(x) – b t1(x)                ;    x- t2(x) = [x- t1(x)] + b t1(x)
where t2(x) is the new schedule and a and b are positive/negative constant parameters
according to a tax cut/hike.
Following Pfähler (1984) if we have to choose between these reforms, the best way to share
between income units the required changes in the income tax yield is to follow a RP neutral
policy if we apply a tax cut and a LP neutral policy for the tax hike. In this way post tax
income inequality is less and social welfare is higher, according to the Lorenz (or, more
                                                
11 - See Jakobsson (1976) and Kakwani (1977a).
12 - Realistically we can exclude the case of equality of g (pre and post reform) with the constancy of two indexes,
although this is theoretically possible.
13 - From the empirical evidence, we shall see that this seems to be the case of the Italian tax reform proposal.
14 - Residual progression = RP = ex - t(x), x  =  (d (x - t(x)) / dx) (x /x - t(x));  Liability progression  = LP = e t(x), x  =
8precisely, Concentration) dominance criterion and Atkinson theorem (it can be shown those
two curves for post tax incomes, or taxes - LX – T  or L T - do not intersect and have the same
mean for both).
Looking at a single-crossing reform, as before the revenue could be neutral, increasing or
decreasing. About the distributional effects, there are two cases: the old and new tax schedule
cross once, the new one crossing the old one from below or from above. The former leads to
redistribution from rich to poor, for the latter the opposite is the case.
For instance, according to Dardanoni-Lambert (1988), it is possible to give some normative
evaluation when the tax reform is inequality reducing:
[1] for any before-tax distribution : g2 ≤ g1 (by t1(x) Æ t2 (x)) and the new schedule crosses
the old one from below. The mean of post tax incomes is higher or equal, the redistribution
operates to reduce inequality (accepting the Dalton’s Transfer Principle), hence the GL curve
after the tax reform is higher relatively to the GL curve for the old schedule and social
welfare level follows by Shorrock’s theorem: it is higher for tax reform, for all increasing
and strictly concave U(•);
[2] for any before-tax distribution : g2 > g1 (by t1(x) Æ t2 (x)) and the new schedule crosses
the old one from below.
The conditions are more stringent than [1]  because GLX – T (p) after the tax reform crosses the
old GLX – T (p) from above (inequality reducing but with a lower mean, µ(1 – g2) ≤ µ(1 – g1),
then with an inferior efficiency): to approve the tax reform normatively we need to decrease
‘enough’ the variance in the ‘new’ distribution of post tax incomes.
With reference to reform where a non-progression neutral tax cut/hike for all applies, I
postpone the analysis to the last section of this essay whereas, concerning a double-crossing
reform (of new and old tax schedule) justifiable by welfare approval, we refer to Lambert
(2001, pp. 231-235).
2.4   The Typical Income Tax: Social Heterogeneity
Until now we are assessing by using some uncomplicated basis:
a) non-income factors are completely neglected by income tax schedules, they apply only
on money incomes;
                                                                                                                                           
(d t(x) / dx) (x / t(x)) ; Average rate progression = ARP = d( t(x)/x) / dx.
9b) as a result every individual utility, heart of the Welfare ‘measure’ (the average utility
in society), is function only of money incomes;
c) 0 ≤ t (x) < x, 0 ≤ t’(x) <1;
d) the allocation of pre tax incomes is given: a partial equilibrium analysis where
incentive effects are excluded by construction (ceteris paribus condition).
As a result of the assumption a), we employed a personal tax schedule t(x) where x is pre–tax
money income: this could be considered a correct procedure only if all households are equal in
size (and, possibly, composition)15 that is, if there is social homogeneity. Clearly this looks an
improbable case and in the real world tax systems should take into account this matter.
The usual way used by practitioners is to apply an equivalence scale to deflate appropriately
household money incomes, to have a common base of measure and rise above the
heterogeneity problem. The equivalence scale uses a coefficient (zn) for each type of family
size and relative composition and it obtains a distribution of equivalent pre tax income (and a
distribution of equivalent post tax income) dividing every households money income by these
coefficients.  They should reflect the differing needs of the relevant households: this is a matter
of value judgment and it is not unusual to find differing opinions about the fairness of the
coefficients of applied equivalence scales (moreover, how do they take full account of all non-
income significant factors?).
After this type of conversion, only now it can apply all the theoretical and social welfare
results described above: from Ebert (1997, 1999) it can be shown that the best way, especially
for the distributional analysis, is first to construct a standard individual, an artificial population
of income units, substituting an household of size n “by a set of zn equivalent adults” .
By using this fictional individual concept the literature showed (Lambert, 2001, par. 10.1)
which has to be the right income tax procedure when the population of households is socially
heterogeneous. The goal is to avoid non-horizontally inequitable households’ income tax. To
ensure this, families with equal pre tax utility level must confirm this equality also after the
taxation.
Unfortunately many problems may take place and is very likely that, by a typical income tax,
unequal treatment of equals rise up: this occurs when the tax system does not use a t(x)
function with 0 ≤ t’(x) < 1 (homogenous case), or when tn (x) = zn τn ( x / zn ) and τn is not the
same schedule for all the families (heterogeneous case). In these cases:
                                                
15 - It seems obvious that a family of size n ≠ 1 where only an individual gains should be treated in a different way
relatively to a single person household: starting from equal pre-tax incomes situation, we have different level of
pre tax purchasing power in these families and it is the living standard that is linked with the well-being.
10
• in all formulas defined on this section, it has to use equivalent income terms (the living
standard);
• all the formulas derive results about households, not individuals;
• LX – T  is no more a Lorenz curve but a concentration curve; to define the position of the post
tax Lorenz curve it has to take into account a correction factor reflecting the extent of
reranking (R): when R is at work a difference between the pre tax and post tax rankings of
(equivalent) income units is present and the post tax Lorenz curve is always dominated by
the LX – T .  The original measures of effective progression change relationship, from16
ΠRS = g / (1 – g) ΠK           to       ΠRS = g / (1 – g) ΠK - R
It can refine the decomposition of the Reynolds-Smolensky index, capturing as well as the
Kakwani index an effect (negative) of classical horizontal inequity17 not present if equals
had been treated equally;
• it still holds the last assumption of this section.
 Now, it is time to verify if these instruments are useful to assess, where feasible, the Italian
income tax reform using the empirical evidence.
3 - Empirical Evidence: First Results
The first stage of the Italian income tax reform started in 2003 (then, with the income tax
document of 2004). The Executive method is proceeding by various steps: in accordance with
the parliamentary majority objectives, at the beginning the tax cut has been concentrated on the
bottom part of income parade (Bosi and Baldini 2004). Clearly only at the end of the transition
period, the characteristics and the redistributive effect of the tax reform will be definitive.
All papers focus on the government proposal, but during period between 2000 up to July
2002 distinct information about the design of tax reform became available for the analysts: for
instance, the first paper was on hand in 2000 and redistributive results went out according to
the electoral plan of the upcoming government.
During time doubts are decreased by an improved definition of the proposal and, finally, by
the appearance of ‘official’ case studies simulating the tax reform effects on individual tax
liability, average rates and post tax income.
It can divide papers into three categories, according to different available information
                                                
16  - See Kakwani (1984, 1986).
17  - See Aronson et al. (1994).
